Media
The Kremlin turns on its own as the propaganda war moves inward
Pro-war bloggers once shielded by loyalty now face criminal charges, smear campaigns and the Kremlin's tightening grip.
![Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Military-Political Work of the Russian Defense Ministry, Apti Alaudinov looks on ahead of the inauguration ceremony of Russia's President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on May 7, 2024. [Sergei Bobylyov/POOL/AFP]](/gc6/images/2025/12/30/53301-afp__20240830__36f33mq__v1__highres__russiaukraineconflict-370_237.webp)
By Ekaterina Janashia |
Public loyalty to Russia's war in Ukraine no longer offers protection. Pro-war bloggers, including self-styled "war correspondents," are increasingly facing the same repressive tools the Kremlin once reserved for critics. Authorities have labeled them "foreign agents" and opened criminal cases under extremist statutes.
At first glance, the crackdown looks like the Kremlin trying to rein in a radical, ultra-patriotic fringe that could complicate any future peace talks. But the pattern suggests something more transactional: personal feuds and competition over dwindling volunteer and funding streams, wrapped in the rhetoric of discipline and national security. At the same time, the spectacle allows the state to project toughness toward "radicals," reassuring a society tired of a grinding war.
Propaganda turns inward
The infighting erupted into public view in November with the detention of Oksana Kobeleva, author of the pro-war Telegram channel "Okhranota V Vatnike." Despite her loyalty to the military, she faced charges of "discrediting the army" after she questioned Chechen General Apti Alaudinov, commander of the "Akhmat" special forces, and by extension, his powerful ally, TV host Vladimir Solovyov.
Days before her arrest, Kobeleva challenged Alaudinov's past comments surrounding the controversial deaths of two soldiers, "Ernest" and "Goodwin," who had accused a commander of drug trafficking and later died on what officials called a suicide mission. Although investigators cleared the command, Kobeleva suggested Alaudinov's remarks hinted at corruption, contradicting the Defense Ministry.
![In this picture taken on December 25, 2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin poses with TV anchor Vladimir Solovyov during an awards ceremony at the Kremlin in Moscow. [Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/AFP]](/gc6/images/2025/12/30/53302-afp__20220425__328x3ll__v1__highres__russiaukraineconflictmediainvestigation-370_237.webp)
The case exposed the vicious rivalries inside Russia's pro-war ecosystem.
Solovyov, widely viewed as a patron of Kobeleva's channel, had earlier praised her role in pushing authorities to brand blogger Svetlana Montyan an extremist after a resurfaced 2015 video insulting President Vladimir Putin. But after Kobeleva targeted Alaudinov, Solovyov distanced himself, denounced her channel, and praised the general as a "brilliant Russian general."
Alaudinov's allies issued threats. The general himself warned the channel's authors would be "taught a lesson."
Facing isolation, Kobeleva deleted her posts, apologized for "friendly fire," and blamed Montyan for stirring the dispute. Authorities still detained her.
Media analyst Ilya Shepelin, who monitors pro-Kremlin outlets, argued that Kobeleva misread the limits of freelance zeal.
"Solovyov works on command: sometimes the command is 'Don't touch,' and sometimes it's 'Attack'," Meduza quoted him as saying in November.
The feud spread beyond Telegram, the platform of choice for many of the "war correspondents."
Marina Akhmedova, editor-in-chief of the Regnum agency and a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, criticized a video of a schoolgirl praising Alaudinov with a an "Islamic messaging" sign-off. She called him "the most garrulous general." He fired back, calling her a "representative of a brothel." Chechnya's human rights commissioner then threatened legal charges unless she apologized. Akhmedova refused, describing Alaudinov as "hysterically thin-skinned."
Fighting for budgets
Experts say these clashes stem less from ideology than from money and influence.
Political analyst Ivan Preobrazhensky told Kavkaz.Realii the battles are about carving up propaganda budgets handed out by the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry. Political scientist Abbas Gallyamov agreed, arguing that declared ideals mask material interests.
Shepelin traced the deeper problem to the system's need to manufacture constant enemies. With the liberal opposition crushed, the security bureaucracy has turned inward.
"While the liberal opposition was hundreds of kilometers from the Kremlin's line, these Z-bloggers are just a kilometer away... Any opinion not initiated by the state is dangerous. With no one else left, they start eating their own," he said.
Shepelin predicted that online pile-ons will give way to extremist designations, and eventually prison, for those who cross the line.
Shield disappears
Until recently, public enthusiasm for the war, and fundraising for frontline units, seemed to offer immunity. Even rivals avoided pushing internal disputes too far, assuming the Kremlin had no interest in infighting among loyalists.
That assumption has vanished. What began as sporadic punishment now looks systematic, as pro-war bloggers face the same risks as other Russians ensnared in the security state.
The public messaging serves a dual purpose.
First, it warns other bloggers to check their impulses, avoid unsanctioned criticism and follow signals from above. Second, it tells ordinary citizens that the Kremlin stands ready to curb even its most zealous supporters if they threaten control, a symbolic gesture aimed at a population weary of a war with no clear end.
The result is a paradox the Kremlin appears willing to cultivate: a universe of fervently pro-war influencers whose loyalty no longer guarantees safety, and whose occasional punishment doubles as propaganda.