By Olha Chepil | 2025-07-03

When Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, Russians could still flip the channel and hear the government criticized on live TV. Within a year, that era was over. The Kremlin's first major target was NTV, the country's leading independent television network at the time.

"NTV was destroyed and its owner, [media tycoon Vladimir] Gusinsky, got kicked out of there. After the 2000s, the Russian state gradually monopolized the media," exiled sociologist Igor Eidman, whom Russian authorities labeled a foreign agent, told Kontur.

By 2001, under political and financial pressure, the channel fell under state control.

Putin moved to create a "Unified Information Space," a concept meant to filter information under the guise of combating disinformation, Ukrainian political scientist Ihor Chalenko said.

In practice, it allowed the Kremlin to consolidate control through coercive ownership transfers. ORT became Channel One, run by the presidential administration; NTV was absorbed by Gazprom-Media, closely tied to the state.

"They explained this by saying that the TV channel [NTV] had huge debts of $200 or $300 million. But in reality, it was a public purge," Chalenko told Kontur.

The state dismantled or absorbed other outlets, including TV-6, TVS and RIA Novosti, and cracked down on regional journalism. A loyal cadre of journalists -- the Kremlin press pool -- emerged to amplify the government line.

"A vast scripted reality show" was how Peter Pomerantsev in his 2014 book Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible described the Russia that Putin was building.

The state captured the independent press, journalist Alexei Baranovsky, a veteran of the Freedom of Russia Legion, said.

"It wasn't the fall of independent media that led to authoritarianism, but the rise of a Chekist [KGB] state that led to the media being incorporated into Putin's fascist system," he said.

Propaganda as a strategy

In the 2000s, the Kremlin launched a systematic assault on free speech. The campaign followed a three-pronged approach: force ownership changes at media outlets, purge editorial staff and tighten legal controls over the internet, said Chalenko.

"In just 10 years, 43 or 45 journalists were killed. These were not war victims. These were political assassinations," Chalenko said, citing the 2006 killing of Anna Politkovskaya as the turning point.

Politkovskaya, a journalist for Novaya Gazeta and a fierce critic of Putin, was known for her reports on the second Chechen war. She was fatally shot in her Moscow apartment building on October 7, 2006 -- Putin's birthday. The masterminds behind the murder remain unidentified.

"Once in office, Putin moved quickly to reassert control over the Russian narrative," said Eidman.

That control extended beyond Russia's borders. In 2005, the Kremlin launched Russia Today, an English-language news channel that soon became a global propaganda outlet. It changed its name to RT in 2009.

"After 2014, Russia Today turned into an instrument of influence, not even just influence, but a way to disinform the world community about the situation in Russia, about the wars that Russia is waging," said Eidman.

Analysts say RT has played a key role in Russia's hybrid warfare: first during the 2008 war in Georgia, then the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and later the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The outlet promotes anti-Western narratives, spreads conspiracy theories and blurs facts.

"Look at [RT]'s budgets, which are being scaled up around the world. They produce so much disinformation that it simply overshadows normal information," said Chalenko. The Kremlin refined its playbook during the second Chechen war, worked on it in Georgia and recycled it in Ukraine, he said.

Moscow learned from its failure to control the narrative over its invasion of Georgia in 2008, said Baranovsky.

"It began to actively invest in international propaganda," he said. "Billions of rubles went to RT and to 'brainwashing' Europeans."

Post-truth as a system

By 2012, the Kremlin's grip on information had extended beyond television to the internet and schools. The doctrine of "sovereign democracy" -- democratic in name only -- provided the political cover. According to Baranovsky, the strategy was clear.

"Television propaganda is aimed at socially vulnerable groups, at those who are unable to establish cause-and-effect relationships," he said. Children, he added, are indoctrinated early: "Children are zombified through schools, kindergartens and teaching manuals. This [policy] programs them for future wars."

Repression of dissidents, independent editors and so-called "foreign agents" predated 2012 but intensified with digital surveillance. The government blocked websites, prosecuted bloggers and used online "likes" as legal evidence.

Russian propagandists "lost in Georgia [when trying to control the 2008 war narrative] and bet on post-truth. Now they lie so much that it drowns out any reality," said Baranovsky.

Early on, many Russians failed to see the broader implications of the media crackdown.

"They thought it was just a showdown between [oligarch Boris] Berezovsky and Gusinsky. People didn't understand that this was a definite purge of independent journalism," said Chalenko.

The Kremlin also used Russian nationalism as a geopolitical tool, exporting it to pressure neighbors, while limiting it at home.

"Inside Russia, nationalism can exist only in the form of [campy vintage clothing]," said Baranovsky.

"In reality, it [domestic nationalism] split: Some nationalists have joined the anti-Putin opposition and are fighting on Ukraine's side."

The system built between 2000 and 2013 now fuels war, repression and global disinformation, say analysts. Russian propaganda is broadcast in dozens of countries.

"The Kremlin controls what people watch, what they listen to and what information they consume. After all, the information sphere is an integral link in strengthening autocracy," said Chalenko.