Society

War-weariness defines Russian public opinion

Most Russian citizens favor peace talks, yet pessimism about the government's intentions runs deep.

A young woman with a red heart-shaped balloon walks with other commuters at Okhotny Ryad metro station in Moscow on February 21, 2020. [Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP]
A young woman with a red heart-shaped balloon walks with other commuters at Okhotny Ryad metro station in Moscow on February 21, 2020. [Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP]

By Ekaterina Janashia |

Most Russians say they want the war in Ukraine to end. Far fewer believe it will.

An October survey by Chronicles, a project of the independent Levada Center, found 64% of citizens favored peace talks, even as deep pessimism settled in about the Kremlin's intentions. The findings show a country exhausted by conflict but unconvinced its leaders will change course.

War fatigue at home

The survey showed Russians longing for a "compromise peace treaty," though many doubted such an agreement was possible. The weariness was evident in daily life.

For Maria, a 38-year-old teacher in Moscow who requested anonymity, the strain felt both financial and emotional.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony to present presidential prizes for young culture professionals at the Kremlin in Moscow on March 25, 2025. [Alexey Maishev/POOL/AFP]
Russia's President Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony to present presidential prizes for young culture professionals at the Kremlin in Moscow on March 25, 2025. [Alexey Maishev/POOL/AFP]

"I try to avoid talking about this, but I've always had a negative attitude toward what we have to call the SVO [special military operation], and that feeling has intensified," she told Kontur.

"Prices have risen dramatically, you can't travel anywhere, and they treat Russians the same way they treated Germans during and immediately after World War II. We've become outcasts."

She said she feared for her family.

"I often feel a sense of hopelessness, and I'm afraid for my family, for my children," she said, adding that her hardships were "minor compared to what Ukrainians are going through."

What she wanted now was simple: "I want this to end soon -- for them to start negotiations, for the drones to stop flying and exploding."

Her expectations for any near-term repair of international ties were low.

"It's unlikely that relations … will be restored; it might not even happen in our lifetimes," she said. "But the sooner people stop dying, the better. That is a lot."

Expectation gap widens

The survey showed a consistent divide between public preferences and public expectations. Across major issues, the average gap was 25 percentage points.

Nearly two-thirds of respondents said they wanted mutual-concession peace talks. Only 36% believed the government would actually pursue them, a 27-point difference that researchers said reflected readiness for de-escalation paired with doubt about leadership intentions.

Domestic priorities showed an even larger mismatch. While 88% wanted the government to focus on internal and social issues, only 48% expected that to happen -- a 40-point gap. By contrast, only 49% supported raising the military budget, but 78% expected it to increase.

The war's domestic consequences, combined with uncertainty about where policy is headed, have shaped public anxiety about mobilization as well.

Fear and flight

The initial mobilization announcement sent thousands of young men rushing to borders. For Vladislav, a 24-year-old IT specialist from Samara, the decision was immediate.

"I left literally the next day after [Russian President Vladimir] Putin announced mobilization. I just grabbed my passport, got in the car and drove to Georgia," he told Kontur. The trip took him roughly 1,200 kilometers (about 745 miles).

He rejected both the conflict and the government's assurances. Deferments for some IT workers did not apply to him, but he said the details never mattered.

"I didn't really bother delving into all these rules. Honestly, I would have left anyway, because I don't believe any statements or promises from our authorities."

Avoiding conscription was his core motive.

"I didn't want to become cannon fodder in a war that I not only don't support, but refuse to understand. And I don't understand those who justify all this nonsense and horror, let alone support it," Vladislav said.

From Georgia, he viewed talk of de-escalation with deep skepticism.

"Now they're talking about ending the war, about peace. I don't know... And I don't really believe it [will happen] either," he said.

"I can still explain why Putin needs a war, but why would he need peace? He hasn't achieved everything he talked about back in February 2022. What he needs is to destroy all of Ukraine as a state -- then and now."

He doubted any future agreement would be durable.

"[Putin's] achievements are few, he's killed a ton of people -- both his own and others'. And now he's going to run off and make peace? Even if he signs something, Ukraine will still be a thorn in his side. And he won't let go of it."

Vladislav's flight and disillusionment show the conflict facing many young, educated Russians who chose exile over conscription, rejecting the rationale and goals of the war.

The reluctance to serve is reflected in survey data: only 16% wanted mobilization, though 35% expected another wave. While 28% said they would participate "under order," just 9% were willing to volunteer, and 38% said they would not take part at all.

A majority also opposed family involvement: 55% said they would not support a relative signing a military contract, compared with 30% who would.

The pattern reveals a widening psychological divide -- one in which outward expressions of support for the state diverges sharply from the willingness to bear personal risk.

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