By Galina Korol | 2026-04-29

Ukraine has no navy. Russia has one of the world's largest fleets. And yet, after three years of war, Russia's Black Sea Fleet is trapped at a single port, taking drone strikes at the pier while its crews get sent to fight as infantry.

That paradox sharpened on the night of April 6, when Ukrainian drones struck a Project 11356R frigate, likely the Admiral Essen, at Novorossiysk Naval Base. These frigates are the fleet's most capable remaining surface assets, carrying Kalibr cruise missiles. The strike proved that even ships that never leave port are no longer safe.

H.I. Sutton, a naval analyst, reached a blunt conclusion in an April 9 piece for Naval News: Russia's Black Sea problem is "worse than it looks."

A trap of its own making

After Ukraine's missile sinking of the cruiser Moskva in April 2022 -- the fleet's flagship and command center -- Russia relocated much of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. The move was supposed to solve the vulnerability problem. It didn't.

As Sutton notes, the protective sea walls of Novorossiysk "have turned into a trap." Maksym Palamarchuk, an expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), told Kontur the problem is not a poor location choice -- it is a complete lack of alternatives.

"Essentially, no place remains in the Black Sea that Ukrainian forces cannot reach," Palamarchuk said. If a fleet stays locked in its base, the purpose of its existence comes into question.

Russia has no viable backup ports. Neither Sochi nor Ochamchira can accommodate significant forces. Moving ships through inland waterways to the Caspian Sea would mean exiting this theater of war entirely.

"I think Novorossiysk will be the end of the line. There is nowhere else to go, and they cannot exit the Black Sea because Türkiye has closed the straits," said Capt. 1st Rank (ret.) Volodymyr Zablotsky, a Ukrainian naval analyst and Defense Express correspondent. He told Kontur the fleet faces a choice with no good options: absorb drone strikes in port, or put to sea where the same threats await.

How the fleet lost its function

The fleet's degradation did not happen overnight. It is the result of a structural shift in how naval warfare works, one that outpaced Russia's ability to adapt.

"Essentially, the fleet played a supporting role from the very beginning," Zablotsky said. Russia had planned an amphibious landing in the early days of the invasion. That plan was stopped cold.

What followed was methodical attrition. Ukraine used aerial drones to draw Russian attention, then sent maritime drones into Sevastopol Bay on the night of October 28–29, 2022, damaging three ships including the frigate Admiral Makarov. It was the first remote naval operation of its kind.

Since then, Ukrainian maritime drones have sunk ships at anchor and underway. "In at least four cases, ships were attacked and destroyed while in motion, despite having the opportunity to maneuver and return fire," Zablotsky said. The fleet has proven, in his assessment, "incapable of protecting even itself."

Stripped of crews and purpose

The degradation goes beyond ships and tactics. Pavlo Lakiychuk, head of security programs at the Center for Global Studies "Strategy XXI," said prolonged confinement to base is destroying crew morale. Some ships have not returned home in years while their sailors' families remain in Sevastopol.

Since late 2023, Russia has compounded the problem by pulling sailors off large ships and deploying them as infantry in Ukraine.

"Morale in the Russian Navy roughly matches the general morale prevailing in the Russian army today. Everyone knows: today or tomorrow you'll be 'sent to the meat grinder,' and if they don't get you there in time, Ukrainian drones will," Lakiychuk told Kontur.

Russia continues to invest in building and repairing ships, a signal that institutional momentum has replaced strategic logic. The fleet still exists on paper. Its original purpose has not.

"Their overconfidence was their undoing," Lakiychuk said.