By Galina Korol | 2026-04-30

The Kremlin has a plan for Ukraine. Three of them, in fact.

According to Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), Moscow is running several scenarios in parallel: drag the war to 2028, freeze the front line, or expand the conflict beyond Ukraine's borders. The critical question, which of these scenarios is already in motion, may define European security for years to come.

All three scenarios hinge on the same variables: money, manpower, decisions in European capitals and Beijing's appetite for deeper involvement.

"The China factor remains," Serhiy Kuzan, director of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, told Kontur. China has effectively offset Ukrainian strikes on Russian production by enabling new assembly lines with Chinese machinery, he said, expanding drone output and slightly expanding missile capacity.

Running on fumes

The war-until-2028 scenario depends almost entirely on resources -- above all, oil revenue.

When crude prices approached $60 per barrel, Russia's ability to sustain the war came into question. The outbreak of conflict involving Iran pushed prices back up, giving Moscow more room. At the same time, Ukraine continues to strike oil infrastructure.

"If we physically shut down their oil exports and refining, no one will be fighting for long," Kuzan said.

The damage is cumulative. In March alone, Russia's oil industry absorbed at least $2.3 billion in losses, with fuel shortages hitting dozens of regions, according to Ihor Petrenko, a political scientist and head of the United Ukraine analytical center.

"Repeated strikes on the same facilities make a proper recovery impossible," Petrenko told Kontur. "We are dealing with a process of slow financial erosion. The horizon of Russian economic resilience is measured in years, not months."

On the battlefield, the Russian advance is slowing. Kuzan noted the cost of each territorial gain has doubled or tripled compared to last year.

The prolonged war scenario, however, requires future mobilization -- something Moscow has so far avoided publicly.

"For the first time in a long while, Russia is losing more than it gains," Petrenko said.

The strategist who was failed

If attrition bites hard enough, the Kremlin may reach for a freeze -- presenting it not as defeat, but as the logical response to incompetent generals.

"For Putin personally, this is a kind of insurance. In any case, he emerges as the 'strategist who was failed,'" Petrenko said.

The narrative is historically familiar. The archetype of the ill-informed tsar and corrupt advisers runs deep in Russian political culture. Selective dismissals and a search for scapegoats are already underway, Petrenko said.

A freeze would not mean peace. In his assessment, it would mean fixing the front line without formal recognition, partially lifting sanctions, restoring Russian exports, blocking Ukraine's NATO membership, and preserving Moscow's levers of influence.

"A freeze without guarantees is a strategic trap" that could lead to a new cycle of aggression within a few years, Petrenko said.

Testing Article 5

The third scenario is the most aggressive and may already be underway.

The NSDC's Center for Countering Disinformation warns that Russia is considering targeted actions against the Baltic states, potentially enabled by a bill allowing Russian military deployment abroad to "protect Russian citizens."

On April 15, Russia's Ministry of Defense published a list of addresses for enterprises across Europe it described as "Ukrainian" and "joint" drone production sites. Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called the list "a directory of potential targets for the Russian Armed Forces."

"Sleep soundly, European partners!" Medvedev wrote on X.

Kuzan said this logic has its own strategic appeal. Rather than grinding down reserves on a large-scale Ukrainian offensive, the Kremlin could force NATO allies to address problems on the alliance's northern flank, redirecting attention and resources.

The format would stop short of direct war with NATO. It would look like drone provocations, sabotage, cyberattacks, and strikes on logistics -- a hybrid campaign below the threshold that triggers Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In 2025, NATO airspace violations exceeded the total for the previous three years combined, Petrenko noted.

"The goal is to show that Article 5 does not work automatically. It is a political victory, and a relatively cheap one for the Kremlin," he said.

Moscow views 2026–2028 as a strategic window for testing the alliance's boundaries, timed, in part, to the US political cycle.

"This is the main temporal landmark that must not be overlooked, whether in Kyiv or in European capitals," Petrenko said.