Politics
Documents show China supplying Belarus's sanctioned arms industry
A trove of signed contracts and internal records details how Chinese firms helped Belarus bypass sanctions and supply Moscow.
![Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka plant a dragon spruce tree symbolizing the friendship between the two nations, in Minsk, capital of Belarus, May 10, 2015. [Xinhua/Li Tao/AFP]](/gc6/images/2025/12/15/53138-afp__20150510__xxjpbee000146_20150511_tppfn0a001__v1__highres__belaruschinaxijinping-370_237.webp)
By Galina Korol |
On paper, Belarus's optics factories should be idle -- cut off from the microchips, lasers and precision glass that power modern tank sights. Yet assembly lines kept rolling.
A trove of internal documents obtained by BelPol shows why: China stepped in with the parts that sanctions were meant to block, allowing Minsk to keep supplying Russia's war machine.
BelPol, a group of former Belarusian security officials, found that China had become Belarus's main supplier of technology, components and equipment after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The November report concluded that instead of collapsing, Belarus's military-industrial complex adapted and deepened its role in Moscow's defense production.
![Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Tianjin, north China, August 31, 2025. [Xie Huanchi/XINHUA/ Xinhua/AFP]](/gc6/images/2025/12/15/53137-afp__20250831__xxjpbee000379_20250831_pepfn0a001__v1__highres__scotianjinsummitchina-370_237.webp)
Direct evidence
Uladzimir Zhyhar, a BelPol representative, told Kontur the findings rested on original, signed documents, not inference.
"Some of the materials are documents with signatures of high-ranking officials from Belarus, China and Russia," Zhyhar said.
Internal agents inside Belarus, he added, gathered the material at significant personal risk.
"We're not just seeing payment routes and export bills of lading. We have orders, memos, agreements and signatures of decision-makers," he said.
BelPol shared the documents confidentially with European and Ukrainian partners but avoided publishing them to protect sources.
The result is a rare, documented look at how China helped Belarus circumvent sanctions and sustain Russia's wartime production.
Chinese padding
One of the clearest examples involved high-precision optical sights for Russian armored vehicles, including T-72B3, T-80U and T-90M tanks.
Belarusian firms Peleng and BelOMO, both under sanctions, served largely as final assembly sites, while China produced most of the sophisticated mechanical and optical components.
To hide these shipments, the government of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in 2022 created a Chinese intermediary, Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited, run by Belarusian nationals.
The company became the main operator of covert procurements. According to the report, it signed contracts with Chinese manufacturers, including Supreme Transmission Technology (Huizhou) Co., Ltd., to deliver thousands of parts worth more than 184 million yuan ($26 million).
Zhyhar said Belarus sent technical documentation to China, where suppliers manufactured the most complex components.
"Belarus wasn't capable of filling this order, so some of the components along with the documentation were translated into Chinese, sent to China, manufactured there and then shipped back to Belarus. In Belarus everything was assembled and then sent on to the Russians," he said.
Observers noted that China also replaced components Taiwan previously supplied.
When sanctions restricted the laser module for the Sosna-U sight, Haucore Ltd. provided a diode essential to a system installed on roughly 1,800 Russian tanks.
Moving into the shadows
Pavlo Rad, a junior fellow at Ukrainian Prism, said Belarus and China had collaborated militarily since the 1990s, when Minsk off-loaded Soviet-era stock. Joint projects expanded through the 2000s and peaked in the mid-2010s. But Russia's 2022 invasion pushed the cooperation underground.
"After Lukashenka found himself isolated in the region . . . this cooperation became more selective, and it became secret," Rad told Kontur.
Zhyhar said China's caution stemmed from fear of US secondary sanctions.
"China isn't very interested in supplying equipment, component parts or supplies directly to Russia because in doing so China may subject its businesses to secondary sanctions by the United States," he said.
Using Belarus as a transit point shields Chinese firms while advancing Russia's war needs. Minsk, Zhyhar added, became both a "transmission link" and an active participant in a system that fits the Lukashenka regime's strategy.
BelPol also found that China helped build a full munitions-production chain inside Belarus.
Dalian Sunlight Machinery Co., Ltd. delivered equipment for 122 mm rocket-projectile components; China National Electronics Import & Export Corp. provided an automated line for fitting warheads; and Aerospace Long-March International Trade Co. Ltd. supplied explosive-related parts.
"China helped establish Belarus's production of munitions -- the metal part because Belarus lacks the technologies to produce explosives. Belarus supplies empty blanks to Russia, where they're filled with explosives," Rad said.
Pressure on Beijing
BelPol presented the report in Kyiv and at a closed briefing at the European External Action Service in Brussels.
"We're trying to make sure that the Western partners clearly understand China's role. The sanctions pressure on China needs to be ramped up," Zhyhar said.
Few Chinese companies, he noted, faced penalties proportional to their involvement.
Rad argued that sanctions regimes must evolve as Belarus, Russia and China develop new workarounds. Aligning penalties on Belarusian and Russian defense industries and crafting a coherent EU strategy toward Minsk, would help close major loopholes.
Experts believe that publicizing document-based evidence remains one of the most effective tools available to democratic governments. If China is pushed out of the scheme, both Belarus and Russia would struggle to maintain weapons production -- a shift that would directly aid Ukraine.