Politics
A war of words: Moscow's push to divide Poland and Ukraine
Troll networks and political opportunism are amplifying anti-Ukrainian messages online, testing Poland's resilience as the war drags on.
![Russian propaganda has been directed at Polish users of social networks. Millions of Poles every day fall prey to the influence of Kremlin bots and trolls. Warsaw, November 11. [Olha Hembik/Kontur]](/gc6/images/2026/01/08/53415-propaganda-1-370_237.webp)
By Olha Hembik |
Researchers tracking Polish-language social media found something alarming: anti-Ukrainian content surged 98% between August and November, reaching tens of millions of users. Behind much of it were coordinated pro-Russian networks designed to erode public support for Ukraine -- one post, one rumor, one argument at a time.
The Demagog association and the Media Monitoring Institute found that nearly all of the negative messaging spread on X. Analysts said in their December report that waves of hostile comments appeared after key political moments in Poland and after security incidents tied to Russia.
A surge with intent
Experts tie the spikes to a widening pro-Russian ecosystem and to political campaigns that help push divisive narratives into the mainstream.
"Ten thousand Russian propaganda soldiers are sitting at computers and producing false stories. That's like five military brigades of trained specialists," Polish war correspondent Piotr Kaszuwara told Kontur.
![Ukrainian refugees are still coming to Poland to avoid the hardships of war or to spend the winter in safety. Warsaw, December 17. [Olha Hembik/Kontur]](/gc6/images/2026/01/08/53416-propaganda-3-1-370_237.webp)
He said Russia treats disinformation as the opening phase of conflict -- to weaken the adversary "and only after that start shooting at them."
"This is a war where no hostages are taken," Kaszuwara said.
Propagandists recycle earlier crises to keep suspicion alive. After a missile struck near Przewodów in 2022, killing two people, anti-Ukrainian accounts framed it as "a Ukrainian attack on Poland," glossing over the context that it likely came from air defenses responding to Russian fire.
When Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace in September before being destroyed, claims quickly appeared online accusing Ukraine -- or NATO -- of staging a provocation.
Politics, history -- and hate
Demagog's researchers found that anonymous accounts, joined at times by Polish politicians, helped carry such narratives. International relations expert Stanislav Zhelikhovsky told Kontur that the pre-election climate made the information space easier to manipulate. Russia, he said, sought to exploit that moment.
Coordinated comments and fake profiles push resentment and doubt. On November 11, Ukrainian House in Warsaw, a cultural hub and support center for refugees, became a target after a deepfake video falsely depicted its leader, Myroslava Keryk, attacking Poles as ungrateful. The organization confirmed the video was fabricated.
The Kremlin also leans on painful history to darken perceptions of Ukrainians, the Disinfo Digest portal reported, repeatedly invoking the 1943 Volhynia massacres and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
Kaszuwara meets some of that messaging head-on -- even playfully.
"When I see Russian narratives about Volhynia, I write a post about how we're marking the anniversary of how Poland along with the Ukrainians set the Kremlin on fire," he said. "Then for a few days the pro-Russian commentators are too discombobulated to respond."
Tapping public anxieties
The propaganda works best when it touches everyday concerns. Social media highlights crimes involving foreigners, though officials say noncitizens make up only a small share of offenses. Other claims accuse Ukrainian refugees of receiving faster access to healthcare.
Economic fears create another opening. Reports from OKO.Press show how labor worries are turned into hostility, even as narratives contradict themselves -- from warnings that Ukrainians will take jobs to complaints that they avoid work.
Marcin Kołodziejczyk, international recruitment director for the migration platform EWL, said the reality is different. Ukrainians have become essential to the workforce and "spend money that they earn here, also in Poland," he said.
"The Ukrainians are saving the Polish labor market -- both those who came to Poland before the full-scale invasion and war refugees," Kołodziejczyk told Kontur. He said nearly 80% of refugees who arrived after the invasion now work, many moving into better roles as they settle.
Polish officials say they are trying to blunt the impact. Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski told Ukrinform in December that exposing troll networks helps the public see that the content is not homegrown and is meant to undermine Ukraine.
Zhelikhovsky said tighter cooperation between Warsaw and Kyiv could strengthen cybersecurity and defenses against sabotage. High-level coordination, he added, would signal that Moscow cannot split the allies.
Kaszuwara sees a hard truth in the battle over narratives.
"We need to create our own propaganda before the Russian propaganda starts to work. Unfortunately, that's how these things operate. There's no other way," he argued.