By Halyna Hergert | 2026-04-03

A map showing Russian invasion corridors sweeping into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania went viral in late March. Broad red arrows targeted the Narva crossing, pointed at Riga, and traced the Suwalki Gap -- that narrow strip between Poland and Lithuania long considered one of NATO's most vulnerable points. The visual language deliberately echoed the "Kyiv in three days" logic of Russia's February 2022 offensive.

There was just one problem: it wasn't new.

Kontur found no confirmation that German outlet Bild had published any such map in late March, despite captions claiming otherwise. Ukrainian outlet Informator.ua traced the graphic back to The Times, where it first appeared on February 14, 2024 -- more than a year earlier. Someone had stripped the original context and repackaged it to manufacture urgency.

"To me, this looks more like a PSYOP -- a hybrid hype campaign," political analyst Ihor Reiterovich, head of political and legal programs at the Ukrainian Center for Social Development, told Kontur. "It is an attempt to destabilize the situation while signaling: 'While you are distracted, we can prepare such scenarios.'"

Behind the arrows

The map may have been fabricated, but the underlying threat logic is not. Military expert and reserve colonel of the Ukrainian General Staff Oleg Zhdanov points out that Russian President Vladimir Putin never accepted Baltic sovereignty to begin with.

"Since they were part of the USSR, he does not recognize the sovereignty or independence of these states at all," Zhdanov told Kontur.

Reiterovich acknowledges that today's geopolitical environment has created what he calls a "positive window of opportunity" for the Kremlin, and that a surgical strike scenario, not a full-scale invasion, is the idea gaining traction. Online groups have even created pages titled "Narva People's Republic." The logic would be political, not military: seize a sliver of NATO territory and test whether the alliance responds.

But between the arrows and the action lies a serious gap. Reiterovich notes the absence of telltale signs of genuine preparation.

"We don't see any troop movements, we don't see any other steps, and such an operation is quite difficult to carry out without a serious concentration of forces in Belarus," he said.

He also raised the central uncertainty Moscow cannot resolve: how the alliance would respond. Russian aggression, he argued, might do the opposite of what Putin intends -- not fracture NATO, but unify it.

"Western countries have total air dominance. If the Alliance air forces are engaged, they wouldn't even need a ground operation -- they could simply wipe out Russian columns with missiles and aviation," Reiterovich said.

Estonia is ready

Even if Moscow attempted something, the Baltics would not make it easy.

Tallinn-based professor of international law Evgeny Tsybulenko, who warned of a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine as early as 2008, told Kontur that Estonia has rearmed -- purchasing HIMARS, anti-ship missiles and self-propelled artillery -- and built a layered civil defense system.

Central to that system is Kaitseliit, a voluntary paramilitary organization integrated into the country's defense architecture.

"It is a highly combat-ready structure trained, among other things, for anti-sabotage operations," Tsybulenko said. He added that Estonia's forested, swampy terrain is poorly suited to armored advance, and that Ukrainian veterans have participated in exercises with both the army and Kaitseliit.

"If any 'little green men' enter, they will be cleared out within twenty-four hours at most," he said. In the event of an attack, he stressed, resistance starts automatically -- no local commander could order troops to stand down.

There is also the question of Russian manpower. Although the Kremlin reconstituted its Leningrad and Moscow military districts specifically with a NATO scenario in mind, the pool of contract volunteers is thinning. Open mass mobilization carries a steep political cost at home.

"The Russian public will view mobilization extremely negatively. The logic is simple: why should we go and die for nothing when others were dying for millions before us?" Reiterovich said.

"Putin cannot sustain two wars. Military history shows that no commander has ever won a war on two fronts," Zhdanov added.

The more immediate threat, both analysts agreed, remains in the gray zone -- espionage, arson, information operations, support for friendly political movements.

"Currently, Europe faces a threat from intelligence and sabotage operations," Zhdanov said. "They are already waging a full-scale hybrid war against European countries and even the US."

Tsybulenko, despite his well-documented record of early warnings, drew a measured conclusion.

"I believe the situation now is not quite as critical," he said, "as long as Ukraine holds out."