By Halyna Hergert | 2026-04-03

In Narva, Estonia, residents have reportedly found leaflets in their mailboxes. The design is deliberate -- black-and-white, styled after Soviet agitprop posters, featuring a uniformed man pointing directly at the viewer. Below his finger, a single question: "Will you help Narva?"

It mirrors the logic of a classic Soviet propaganda icon: "Did you volunteer?"

The leaflets link to a VK page and a Telegram channel promoting a "Narva People's Republic" -- a non-existent entity whose online architects have published a flag, passport templates, and a map of a proposed territory stretching roughly from Narva to Püssi across approximately 3,600 square kilometers (1,390 square miles) of northeastern Estonia.

This is how it starts.

A familiar playbook

"First comes the information probing, then the formation of local operative networks and the creation of a 'conflict' atmosphere. Only after that do we see attempts at political or military escalation," Viktor Yahun, former deputy head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), told Kontur.

Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal addressed the campaign directly at a March 12 press conference, calling it an information operation.

"These accounts have been in the works for a long time, and all of this is coming from the Russian side," he said. The goal, he added, is not actual secession but manufactured demand: creating the impression, cheaply and with minimal resources, that separatist sentiment exists in Narva.

Borislav Bereza, a former Ukrainian serviceman and member of the eighth Ukrainian Parliament, said the operation is a test of Estonia's reaction speed, not a genuine separatist push.

"This is neither the first nor the last time the Russians have tested the playbook they implemented in the Donetsk region in 2014 -- only now they want to apply it in Narva," he told Kontur.

Yahun echoed the assessment.

"The Kremlin traditionally operates with narratives rather than tanks," he said. "Russia is not testing the city's defenses, but the defense of the system -- how quickly security services react, whether society has the immunity to resist propaganda, and if political institutions are prepared for crisis scenarios."

The primary target, Bereza said, is Estonia's internal security service, the Security Police (KAPO).

"As far as I know, KAPO takes any threats quite seriously; they evaluate them and draw conclusions. I am aware that they are already investigating this specific channel," he said, adding that the service actively monitors Telegram, Facebook, VKontakte, and Odnoklassniki.

Hybrid aggression begins "when the word 'republic' starts appearing in Telegram channels" -- not when soldiers appear at the border, Yahun stated.

A city built for this

Narva's vulnerability is structural. Estonia's third-largest city, it sits directly on the Russian border, facing the Russian town of Ivangorod across the Narva River. Nearly 96% of its approximately 53,000 residents are Russian-speaking -- a demographic legacy of Soviet-era population transfers that mirrored the resettlement policies applied to industrial regions of the Donbas.

Political tension has deep roots. In 1991, as Estonia restored independence, local activists held a plebiscite on autonomy. Though 97% of participants voted yes, a turnout of roughly 55% and Tallinn's ruling that the process was unconstitutional stripped the result of legal standing. The decades that followed brought economic decline and social isolation.

"Only in 2025 did the education system finally transition to the state language of instruction," Vira Konyk, chairwoman of the Congress of Ukrainians in Estonia, told Kontur. "Before that, Russian-language schools persisted, which did little to foster loyalty toward the Estonian state."

Russia has sustained pressure on the city through symbolic means. Since 2022, massive screens erected on the Ivangorod side broadcast May 9 concerts specifically oriented so the stage is visible from Narva.

"Just as in Ukraine, these regions were largely overlooked," Konyk said. "There was an assumption that if a country joined the EU and NATO, the population would automatically be loyal. But that wasn't the case."

Additional provocations have accumulated: removal of border buoys on the Narva River, violations of Estonian airspace, and recorded Russian border guard incursions. Konyk described the "Narva People's Republic" materials as a calculated extension of those tactics.

Is a Donetsk scenario possible?

Bereza is direct about the broader military calculus.

"The Estonians realize that the Russians have not scrapped the idea of an offensive against Estonia; they are noting an increase in personnel on the Russian side and the expansion of the so-called Leningrad Military District."

Baltic state estimates put the potential force at up to 70,000 troops -- significantly higher than some Western projections.

The current phase, Yahun said, is about creating conditions rather than initiating direct action: deploying pseudo-state symbols, spreading narratives about the infringement of Russian speakers' rights, and testing public reaction to radical rhetoric.

Russia has also submitted legislation to the State Duma that would expand the president's authority to deploy armed forces to "protect Russian citizens" abroad -- a legal architecture that could support a staged provocation, Bereza warned.

The comparison to 2014 Ukraine has limits, however. "The situation back then was entirely different — there was a power vacuum and the element of surprise," Konyk said. "Today, everyone understands the risks." Estonia has invested significantly in drone units, civil defense training, and population armament since 2022. KAPO has been monitoring separatist content proactively.

As the saying goes, she added: "Forewarned is forearmed."