By Galina Korol | 2025-08-27

Three and a half years into Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine's ability to innovate remains central to its defense and its future. Naval drones, long-range drones and other tactics have altered the dynamics of the war, but not the underlying stalemate -- neither side has achieved victory through military force.

Against this backdrop, the United States, supported by European allies, is working to convene a high-level meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with diplomacy and security guarantees now central to efforts to bring the conflict to a close.

Meanwhile, analysts continue to explore how Ukraine can preserve leverage on the battlefield.

In an August 11 report, Breaking the Stalemate: Russian Targets Ukraine Should Strike, experts at the Hudson Institute outline eight Russian assets they view as strategic pressure points. According to the researchers, combined strikes on these targets could disrupt Russia's logistics and possibly break the positional phase of the war.

Eight targets

Some of the vulnerabilities lay deep inside Russian territory. The Volga-Don Canal, a major waterway linking the Caspian and Black Seas, allowed Moscow to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet with ships from the Caspian Flotilla. That access, the report noted, made the canal a strategic pressure point.

Russia's growing reliance on drones also stood out. In Tatarstan's Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a plant produced about 190 Shahed kamikaze drones each day, serving as the country's central hub for unmanned aerial vehicle manufacturing.

Ukraine had struck the facility before, but analysts said those attacks caused only modest damage. Disrupting production, they added, would have required different weapons and a longer campaign.

The report also traced Russia's dependence on outside support, particularly Chinese electronics and weapons components.

About 90% of that overland trade moved by rail through the Far East, and nearly 60% passed through a single crossing at Manzhouli-Zabaykalsk. Analysts suggested that strikes on bridges and railyards on the Russian side could have severely slowed those supply lines.

Occupied Crimea figured in the findings as well. As the main transfer point for Russian forces in southern Ukraine, the peninsula depended on the Kerch Bridge and the smaller crossings across the Syvash.

The Syvash bridges, sitting closer to Ukrainian positions, were considered more vulnerable. Damaging them, analysts said, could have cut Crimea off from key resupply routes.

Other vulnerabilities were more unexpected. Russia's plan to establish a new naval base at Ochamchire in occupied Abkhazia could have left its fleet more exposed by positioning it in open terrain, according to the report.

Analysts also pointed to the 1,500 Russian troops isolated in Transnistria, far from reinforcements, and even the distant Pacific Fleet bases, whose marines had fought in Ukraine. Forcing Moscow to divert resources to defend these sites, they argued, could have stretched its capabilities thin.

Reality and the mathematics

Ukrainian experts said the targets mentioned in the report look like an ideal plan, one that would be realistic to carry out if all the necessary weapons and resources were available.

"Finding and exhausting the enemy's main logistical routes is an absolutely workable plan," Sergiy Kuzan, director of the Ukrainian Center for Security and Cooperation, told Kontur. But, he added, feasibility depends on Ukraine's capacity.

"War has its own math -- quotas for regiments, daily ammunition, depth of advance," Kuzan said. "The key question is 'with what [to strike]?' Are resources available? Do you have anything with which to implement your war plan?"

He noted that many of the proposed targets, from drone plants to railway bridges, are hardened against attacks.

"Even if we gather together all our drones and send them to the Shahed plant in Tatarstan, I don't believe we would be able to destroy it," Kuzan explained, noting that railway bridges are designed to withstand even missile strikes.

Kuzan also doubted the effectiveness of hitting land routes from China. Blowing up rail lines requires physical access and heavy explosives, not drones. Even the Kerch Bridge, repeatedly targeted by Ukraine, remains standing.

"We would need to bring tons of explosives there," he said.

He pointed out that Russia's land corridor to Crimea also undercuts the idea of isolating the peninsula; supplies would continue to flow even if the Kerch Bridge were damaged.

At the same time, Kuzan dismissed the Russian contingent in Transnistria as strategically irrelevant.

"I wouldn't agree with [that target] at all," he said, adding that the isolated force plays no role in the war.

Striking with effect

Kuzan proposed a more practical but riskier approach: naval attacks on Russian oil tankers in international waters. He suggested that small unmanned drones, concealed aboard civilian ships, could be used to target tankers and undermine Russia's financial system.

But Kuzan warned that the risks would be enormous. Drone operators could be arrested as terrorists, costing Ukraine its highly trained specialists.

"Operators are an invaluable resource," he said.

Taras Zagorodny, a Ukrainian political scientist and managing partner of the National Anti-Crisis Group, voiced similar views. He argued that striking ports in the Baltic Sea and Novorossiysk, which handle up to 80% of Russia's total trade, would be a more realistic goal.

He also identified the Urengoy gas field as a weak link in Russia's supply routes to China, saying attacks there and on the Power of Siberia pipeline would signal that "oil and gas can only be pumped from Russia with Ukraine's permission."

"These attacks," Zagorodny told Kontur, "would definitely plunge Russia into a deep economic collapse, similar to the Soviet Union."

Alexey Baranovsky, a journalist and veteran of the Free Russia Legion, suggested prioritizing strikes on Russian oil refineries and storage facilities. Paralyzing air traffic, he added, could have significant political impact.

"This is the target that would cause significant political damage to the Russian authorities, since it would provoke mass discontent among the population," he told Kontur.

Experts stressed that these concepts are not immediate prescriptions for escalation but underscore Ukraine's asymmetric options, even as Washington emphasizes summit diplomacy and collective security guarantees.

Despite differing perspectives, experts agreed on one point: the theoretical plan outlined in the Hudson Institute report is sound in principle, but its implementation depends on a key question -- Ukraine's available resources. Current drone capabilities are not sufficient to destroy factories and bridges designed to withstand Iskander strikes.

The experts also observed that the conflict has entered a more asymmetrical phase, where Russia's economic and logistical infrastructure is becoming increasingly significant alongside traditional battlefield objectives.