By Halyna Hergert | 2026-05-13

New satellite photos show construction crews transforming a children's summer camp into a military base 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the Ukrainian border. Roads cut through forests. Embankments rise on the Belarusian frontier. A border post nears completion 860 meters (0.5 miles) from Ukraine.

Belarus is being turned into a staging ground, and the machinery is running.

In April, Ukrainian monitoring project ERadar released the March imagery showing a web of new outposts, training grounds and logistics routes. Observers link the construction to the formation of the Belarusian army's Southern Operational Command (SOC) -- a structure created specifically for the Ukrainian direction.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the buildup directly on April 17, writing on Telegram that Russia would attempt to drag Belarus into its war.

A regime that can't say no

Alyaksandr Lukashenka has responded with contradictory signals. He publicly declares that Belarus is "preparing for war" and that peacetime is over -- then quickly insists the country opposes hostilities. The mixed messaging reflects a regime that has lost room to maneuver.

Mikita Zabuha, a Belarusian opposition politician serving with the Kalinouski Regiment on Ukraine's side, told Kontur that Lukashenka no longer controls the decision.

"Lukashenka lacks agency; they made the decision without him," he said. "The pressure will continue."

Zabuha explained that Lukashenka understands the consequences of appearing to resist Moscow: if he openly tries to dodge the Kremlin, they will strip him of his mandate and replace him with a compliant general. Instead, he pretends his forces "aren't ready" or are tied up defending western frontiers.

The military command structure reinforces this picture.

Ivan Tymochko, military expert and head of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Reservists Council, noted that both the Belarusian defense minister and the chief of the general staff are now either Russian generals or officers trained and promoted within the Russian military.

The numbers don't add up

Despite the construction activity, military analysts question whether Belarus could sustain a real offensive.

Alexander Kovalenko, a military-political analyst with the Information Resistance (IR) group, estimates Belarusian ground forces at 14,000–15,000 combat-ready personnel -- far short of what opening a new front requires.

"The Belarusian army would last roughly two to three weeks before it simply ceases to exist," he told Kontur.

Kovalenko considers limited provocations a more likely scenario than a full-scale invasion: infiltrating border villages, using them as temporary strongpoints, pressuring civilians. But he sees no critical indicators of imminent large-scale action.

Tymochko warned that such provocations carry serious costs. Belarus stretches just 550 to 600 kilometers (340 to 370 miles) north to south, and Belarus's largest oil refinery sits only 30 kilometers (18 miles) from the Ukrainian border -- well within drone range.

Tymochko added that mobilization would create a second threat — from within. Lukashenka would have to arm the same population his security forces violently suppressed.

"An armed populace in Belarus could begin dictating terms to the dictator himself," he said.

Russia's losses -- 1.3 million killed and wounded -- have also made an impression. For Belarus, Tymochko noted, that figure essentially represents the entire male population of reproductive age. Sacrificing a tenth of the nation for a foreign war is not a gamble. It is suicidal.

Quiet mobilization, no enthusiasm

The public's reluctance has done nothing to stop the bureaucratic machinery.

BelPol, an initiative founded by former Belarusian security officials, says the country has built a system of quiet mobilization since 2022.

Vladimir Zhigar, a BelPol representative, told Kontur that the state regularly summons those on the military register for training -- and when health or family problems prevent participation, assigns them to so-called volunteer militias instead.

"Local and regional executive committees purchase uniforms and body armor for these so-called volunteer structures and conduct various tactical and specialized training sessions with them," Zhigar said.

Conscription rules have also changed: notices can now arrive by SMS, and failure to appear carries administrative penalties. For a country with no such practices before 2020, the shift is significant.

"We certainly understand that Lukashenka is paranoid, but they are spending enormous sums on this," Zhigar said. "In our view, they aren't doing this for nothing."

Zabuha argued that external pressure could still matter. Ukraine and the European Union must support and legitimize national resistance, offer an alternative, and help organize structures for those who refuse to follow orders, he said.